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Abstract 
I study an auction in which the auctioneer, an agent of the seller, 
approaches all the bidders and tells them that if they pay a bribe and if 
they submit the highest bid, he will change their bid so that they only have 
to pay the second-highest bid. In equilibrium, only bidders who have 
valuations higher than some critical value pay the bribe, and they bid their 
valuations. Corruption has no effect on either the efficiency of the auction 
or the expected payoffs of the bidders. However, bribery results in a 
transfer of wealth from the seller to the auctioneer. 
1. Introduction 
In many cases, but not all, a sealed-bid auction has an 
auctioneer. Sometimes the auctioneer is a third party in the 
transaction, and sometimes it is an individual who works for the firm 
awarding the prize and who is given the task of colle ting the bids 
from the bidders. The existence of an agent coming between the seller 
and the bidders raises the possibility of corruption in two ways. First, 
the auctioneer could look at the submitted bids and then solicit a bribe 
from the winner after the bids are submitted in exchange for changing 
the bid in a way that is favorable to the winner. In a standard high-bid 
auction, this would entail soliciting a bribe in exchange for lowering 
the winner’s bid down to the second-highest bid. Second, the 
auctioneer could solicit bribes from the bidders before the bids are 
                                                
* I am indebted to Thomas Jeitschko and Wolfgang Köhler and William Neilson for 
helpful comments. 
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submitted1, in exchange for a promise to reduce the bidder’s bid 
should that bidder be the winner. Several existing papers address ex 
post bribery that occurs after all of the bids are submitted.2 This paper 
analyzes ex ante bribery that occurs before the bids are submitted.3 
This is not simply an academic exercise, because ex ante bribery 
has been documented in actual auctions. In their bids for corporate 
waste-disposal contracts in New York City, Mafia families would 
sometimes pay bribes for an “undertaker’s look” at the bids of the 
other bidders before making their own bids.4 In 1997 a Covington, 
Kentucky, developer was shown the bids of two competing developers 
for a $37 million dollar courthouse construction project.5 In Chelsea, 
Massachusetts, in the 1980s, the city’s auctioneer was accused of 
accepting bribes to rig auctions in favor of certain b dders, one time 
serving as a bidder’s agent in an auction he was running.6 Lengwiler 
and Wolfstetter (2000) relay two examples involving German firms 
which they claim provide evidence of ex post bribery, but I think 
provide better evidence of ex ante bribery. In one incident, one bidder 
illegally acquired the application documents of a rival bidder for the 
Berlin airport construction contract, and in a second incident, Siemens 
was barred from bidding in public procurement auctions in Singapore 
                                                
1  Burguet and Che (2004) accept that the bribery competition occurs simultaneously with 
the contract bidding. The authors argue that their model is equivalent to scenarios in 
which bribery occurs before and after contract bidding. First, they suppose that the 
bidders compete in contract bids and then compete in bribes. As a second game they 
examine the case when the bidders first pay bribes and then compete in price bids.    
2  Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2000) analyze auctions i  which the winning bidder can 
bribe the auctioneer to change the bid after the auction has ended. Their results are 
similar to ours, although the results depend on the possibility of the corruption being 
detected and punished. Menezes and Monteiro (2001) consider a scenario in which 
there are two bidders and the auctioneer approaches on  of them to solicit a bribe in 
return for changing the bid. The auctioneer can approach either the winner or the loser.  
Burguet and Perry (2002) study an auction in which one bidder is honest but one is 
corrupt. Burguet and Che (2004) and Celentani and Ganuza (2002) study a procurement 
auction in which the awarding of the contract is baed on both the price and the quality 
of the project, and a corrupt auctioneer can manipulate the quality component in 
exchange for a bribe.   
3  Corruption can also arise through bidding rings, in which the bidders collude to 
increase their surplus from the seller. See, for example, Graham and Marshall (1987), 
McAfee and McMillan (1992), and Marshall and Marx (2002). Comte et al. (2000) link 
the bidding ring literature and the bribery literature with a model of ex post bribery in 
which the bidders use corruption to enforce collusive behavior. 
4  Cowan and Century (2002, pp. 223-231). 
5  Crowley, Patrick, “Bid Scandal Bill in Trouble,” Cincinnati Enquirer, January 21, 
2000. 
6  Murphy, Sean P., “Chelsea Businessman is Said to Allege Attempted Bribery,” Boston 
Globe, September 22, 1993. 
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for five years because they had bribed an official for information 
about rival bids. Since the rival bids could be obtained and used 
before the bribers made their own bids, these could be instances of ex 
ante bribery. 
Finally, I have also been told that auctioneers solicit ex ante 
bribes for some types of procurement contracts in Turkey. The 
contracts are auctioned using a standard first-price sealed-bid auction, 
with the bidder who offers to supply the good at the lowest price 
winning the auction and supplying the good at that price. Before the 
bidding starts, the corrupt auctioneer approaches certain bidders with 
whom he has worked before, and offers to raise their bids to the 
second-best bid if they win in exchange for a bribe.7 
The key feature of these examples is that in every case the 
bidders pay a bribe to secure some action that would allow them to 
earn higher profits if they win, but the bribe is paid before the bidders 
know whether or not they will win. I construct a model to fit this 
feature. The auction is a first-price sealed bid auction with no reserve 
price, with the high bidder winning. Before the bidding, the auctioneer 
announces the size of the bribe he demands. As manybidders as want 
to can pay the bribe, and if a bidder who pays the bribe submits the 
highest bid, the auctioneer lowers the winning bid to the second-
highest bid.8 The high bidder then wins the auction and pays the 
second-highest bid.  
I show that in the case where all bidders draw their valuations 
independently from a single distribution, bidders who have valuations 
higher than some critical value pay a bribe to the auctioneer, and 
bidders with low valuations do not. Bidders who pay the bribe bid 
their own valuations as if they were in a second-price sealed-bid 
auction, and bidders who do not pay the bribe bid according to the 
standard equilibrium bid function from the first-price auction. The 
resulting bid function for all bidders is increasing, and therefore the 
bidder with the highest value wins the auction, whether he pays the 
bribe or not, and the auction is efficient. The bidders’ expected 
                                                
7  Ingraham (2000) uses empirical methods to study bi der-auctioneer cheating in sealed-
bid auctions. Based on statistical properties of the bids, he develops a regression 
method for analyzing potential cheating of this type. He applies this regression 
specification to data from the New York City School Construction Authority auctions, 
and finds evidence that there is cheating between th  auctioneer and the bidders. 
8  We ignore issues related to the credibility of the auctioneer’s promise, assuming instead 
that the promise is enforceable. Credibility might occur, for example, if the auctioneer 
makes this promise repeatedly in auctions over time, so that reputational concerns 
cause the auctioneer to keep the promise. 
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equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by corruption. They are neither 
worse off nor better off in terms of the equilibrium expected payoffs. 
However, there is a transfer of wealth from the seller to the auctioneer.  
I proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the game and the 
notation. Section 3 examines the behavior of bidders, determining 
who pays the bribe and how they bid. Section 4 examines the 
auctioneer’s behavior, characterizing the optimal bribe. Section 5 
explores the welfare properties of the game in comparison to a first-
price auction without corruption. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the 
results. 
2. Structure of the game 
There is a seller of a single good who faces n  risk neutral 
potential buyers. The seller has hired an auctioneer to run a sealed-bid 
first-price auction, and pays the auctioneer a fixed wage (as opposed 
to a commission) in exchange for his services.9 In contrast to the 
standard first-price auction, the game is supplemented by corruption 
between the auctioneer and the bidders. The auctioneer approaches 
every bidder before the auction is held and tells them that if the bidder 
agrees to pay a bribe of α , and is the highest bidder, he pays the 
second-highest bid. If the highest bidder did not pay the bribe, he pays 
his bid. Consequently, the game is a 3-stage game. In the first stage 
the auctioneer sets α , in the second stage the bidders decide whether 
to pay α  independently and simultaneously, and in the third stage the 
bidders choose their bids. 
The bidders’ valuations nvv ,...,1 are independently and 
identically drawn from the distribution F with support [ ]1,0 , with a 
density f, as in the standard symmetric private values model. I assume 
that the value of the object to the seller is zero and the reserve price is 
zero. There is no entry fee, making it optimal for all bidders to bid.  
In a standard first-price or second-price sealed-bid auction a 
bidding strategy is a map ii
i bv →:β . An equilibrium is a profile of 
strategies ( )nββ ,...,1  such that iβ  is a best reply for i  given the 
strategies of all other bidders. An equilibrium is symmetric if all 
bidders use the same strategy, nββ == ...1 . I denote the equilibrium 
                                                
9  In the U.S., at least, many auctioneers are paid a commission based on the sales price. 
Such a payment scheme may reduce the auctioneer’s incent ves to solicit bribes, but 
that issue is left to future research. 
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strategy of the symmetric equilibrium of the first price and second 
price auctions with 1β  and 2β , respectively. 
As is well known, the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-
price auction is the profile of strategies ( )nββ ,...,1  such that all iβ ’s 
are equal and all iβ ’s are best responses for i  given the strategies of 
all other bidders. This unique symmetric equilibrium strategy is given 
by, 













vvbβ             (1) 
Finally, the seller is passive in this game and we ignore issues 
related to the detection and punishment of corruption. 
3. Bidder behavior  
In this section I analyze the behavior of bidders given the size of 
the bribe, α , set by the auctioneer. Specifically, we characterize the 
equilibrium of the subgame that follows the auctioneer’s choice of α . 
To accomplish this, I look for an equilibrium in whic  bidders with 
high valuations pay the bribe, and bidders with lowvaluations do not. 
The first task is to find the bids of bidders who d and do not 
pay the bribe. If a bidder pays the bribe and is the highest bidder, he 
pays the second highest bid. Therefore, after paying the bribe the 
bidder essentially participates in a second price auction, and his 
dominant strategy is to bid his valuation.  
Proposition 1: Any bidder who pays the bribe bids his valuation, 
iv .  
If a bidder does not pay the bribe, if he wins he must pay his 
own bid. Consequently, and for the standard reasons, he bids less than 
his valuation. How much less depends on the behavior of other 
bidders. An immediate result follows if all bidders with lower 
valuations also decline the bribe. 
Proposition 2: If bidder i  does not pay the bribe and all the 
bidders with valuations below iv  do not pay the bribe, bidder i  bids 
according to the function ( )ivb1 . 
Proof: Let ( )vb  denote the equilibrium bid function for bidders 
who choose not to pay the bribe. For the standard reasons, b  is 
assumed to be increasing. By Proposition 1, all bidders who do pay 
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the bribe bid their valuations, and ( )vbv ≥  for all v . If bidder i  does 
not pay the bribe, and all bidders with valuations below iv  also do not 
pay the bribe, bidder i  only wins when his is the highest valuation. 
The theory of first price auctions then implies that, conditional on his 
own valuation being the highest, bidder i ’s optimal bid is then ( )ivb1 .  
Let *v  denote the threshold valuation such that a bidder with
valuation *v  is indifferent about paying the bribe, and, by hypothesis, 
all bidders with valuations above *v  pay the bribe and all those with 
valuations below *v  do not. A bidder with valuation *v  who pays the 









n vdFvbv . A bidder with valuation *v  









n vdFvbv . The fact that the bidder is indifferent reduces 
to 









n vdFvbvb .              (2) 
Thus, given α , the cutoff value *v  must satisfy the above 
equation. 
A second interpretation of *v  arises from noticing that the first 
price bid function, ( )vb1 , is the expected second-highest valuation 












n vvdFvdFvb .             (3) 
                                                













































where the last equality holds through integration by parts. 
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Using this fact, (2) can be re-written as 







n vdFvbv .               (4) 
Equation (4) has a straightforward interpretation. Suppose that a 
bidder with valuation 1v  pays the bribe, bids 1v , and wins the auction, 
and that the second-highest bidder has valuation v . If the second-
highest bidder paid the bribe, he bids v , and the winning bidder’s 
surplus is vv −1 . If the second-highest bidder did not pay the bribe, he 
bids ( )vb1 , and the winning bidder’s surplus is ( ) vvvbv −>− 111 . 
There is a clear benefit when the second highest bidder does not pay 
the bribe. Now, note that revenue equivalence implies that a bidder’s 
expected surplus from a second-price auction is identical to his 
expected surplus from a first-price auction. So, his expected surplus 
(gross of the bribe) is the same if he and everyone els  pay the bribe 
or if he and everyone else do not pay the bribe. Th benefit from the 
bribe, then, must come from the additional surplus from facing people 
who do not pay the bribe. This additional surplus i






n vdFvbv , which is the quantity on the left-hand side of 
(4). The equation says that enough people must choose n t to pay the 
bribe so that the additional surplus from paying the bribe exactly 
offsets the cost of the bribe. 
Figure 1 shows this graphically. Bidders who pay the bribe bid 
according to the second-price auction bid function ( ) vvb =2 , and 
bidders who do not pay the bribe bid according to the first-price 
auction bid function ( )vb1 . The left-hand term in equation (4) is the 
weighted area between these two functions over the interval [0,v*), 
which is shown by the shaded area in the figure.11 The weights are not 
shown in the graph, but they are given by the distribu ion function 
( )vF n 1− . 
                                                
11 The half-open interval [0,v*) is used because it is assumed that a bidder with valuation 
v*, who is indifferent between paying the bribe and not paying it, elects to pay the 
bribe. 
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Figure 1 






















Theorem 1: Given the amount of the bribe α , and given that 




11 )( 1  vdFvbb
nα , then there exists a unique Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium in which bidders with values in [0,v*) do not pay the 
bribe and bidders with values in [v*, 1] do pay the bribe, where *v  
solves 








n vdFvbvb               (5) 
and 1b  is the standard first-price auction bid function. 
Proof: See the appendix.  
Informally, a bidder who draws a value less than *v  prefers not 
to pay the bribe because if he pays the bribe his surplus rises only by a 
fraction of the shaded region in Figure 1 but he must pay an amount 
equal to the entire shaded region, so the bribe makes him worse off. A 
bidder who draws a value higher than *v prefers to pay the bribe 
because the extra surplus in the shaded region is exactly offset by the 
bribe, but if he does not pay the bribe he loses th auction to people 
with valuations lower than his. Put another way, if a bidder with a 
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valuation higher than v* does not pay the bribe, he loses more than it 
costs to pay the bribe. 
The uniqueness of *v  for a given α , together with the fact that 
the left-hand side of (5) is strictly increasing in *v , implies that there 
exists a strictly increasing function ( )α*v  that describes the 
equilibrium threshold valuation as a function of the bribe. 
4. Auctioneer behavior 
In the first period the auctioneer chooses the size of the bribe α  
that a bidder must pay in order to learn the second highest bid if he is 
the highest bidder. So, the auctioneer aims to maxiize his expected 
revenue by choosing α . By Theorem 1, though, for any given α  there 
is a unique threshold valuation *v  such that bidders with valuations 
above *v  pay the bribe and those with valuations below *v  do not. 
Because of the uniqueness, choosing α  is the same as choosing *v . 
Let 









n vdFvbvbvα .             (6) 
The auctioneer’s expected revenue is given by  
( ) ( )( ) ( )*** 1 vvFnvR α−=                                                  (7)
where n  is the number of bidders, ( )*1 vF−  is the probability that a 
given bidder pays the bribe, and ( )*vα  is the size of the bribe. Since 
choosing α  is the same as choosing *v , the auctioneer’s problem is to 
choose *v  to maximize expected revenue. 
It is apparent from (6) that ( )*vα  is continuous since it is 
differentiable. As long as the distribution F  of bidders’ valuations is 
continuous, it follows that ( )*vR  is continuous, which establishes the 
next result. 
Proposition 3: There exists an α that maximizes expected 
revenue, and the corresponding v* lies in the interval (0,1). 
Proof. The problem of choosing α  to maximize revenue is 
isomorphic to the problem of choosing ∈*v  [0,1] to maximize ( )*vR . 
Since the function is continuous on [0,1], it obtains a maximum. 
When ( ) 00 and  0 ,0 * === Rvα .  
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Also, when ( ) ( )  .01 and  ,01 ,1 ** ==−= RvFv Finally, since 
( ) ∈> vvR   when 0*  (0,1), the result holds. 
For some distributions there is a unique α  that maximizes the 
auctioneer’s expected revenue. The uniform distribution is such an 
example. For the uniform distribution the revenue of the auctioneer is 
( ) ( ) ( )*** 1 vvnvR α−=  
where 












So, the auctioneer’s problem becomes 























Surprisingly, this is the expected value of the highest value of 
the n  bidders. Therefore, the auctioneer maximizes his bribe revenue 
by soliciting a bribe so large that only bidders whose valuations are 
above the expected highest valuation pay the bribe. 
Another example is a triangular distribution with a density 












































12* −=  
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5. Welfare properties 
I now turn to the welfare properties of the auction with bribery. I 
am interested in two issues. First, is the auction with bribery efficient; 
that is, does the bidder with the highest valuation get the object? 
Second, how do participants fare in comparison to astandard first-
price auction without bribery? I begin with efficiency. 
Proposition 4: The auction with bribery is efficient. 
In general, an auction that awards the prize to the highest bidder 
is efficient if the bid function is increasing in the bidder’s valuation. In 
















vb              (8) 
where ( )vb1  is the standard first-price auction bid function, which is 
increasing. Since ( ) **1 vvb < , the bid function ( )vb  is increasing, and 
consequently the auction is efficient. 
The next issue is a comparison with a first-price auction without 
bribery. Suppose that the auctioneer sets the bribe at α , and so, by 
Theorem 1, there exists a threshold valuation *v  such that bidders 
with valuations higher than *v  pay the bribe and those with valuations 
below *v  do not. Of course, if a bidder who does not pay the bribe 
wins the auction, no one else has paid a bribe eithr, and the outcome 
of the game is exactly the same as the outcome of the standard first-
price auction without bribery. Furthermore, since only bidders with 
high valuations pay the bribe in equilibrium, no bidder loses to anyone 
who would not have beaten him in the standard first-p ice auction 
without bribery. 
The interesting issue pertaining to the welfare of bidders 
involves bidders who pay the bribe. To that end, suppose that bidder i
has valuation *vvi ≥ , so that bidder i  pays the bribe. His expected 
surplus is 














vdFvvvdFvbvUE α  


















iic vdFvvvdFvvvdFvvUE  
which is a bidder’s expected surplus in a second-price auction. 
From revenue equivalence, however, I know that the expected surplus 
in a first-price auction and the expected surplus in a second-price 
auction are identical, and so bidders are indifferent between the 
auction with bribery and the auction without bribery. By Proposition 
3, however, the auctioneer earns positive expected revenue from 
bribes. Because the auctioneer gains from the bribery ut the bidders 
have the same expected surplus with and without bribery, it must be 
the case that the seller loses what the auctioneer gains. This proves the 
final proposition. 
Proposition 5: In equilibrium, bribes are a transfer from the 
seller to the auctioneer. 
In summary, although bribery changes the bid functio s of some 
bidders, namely those with sufficiently high valuations, it has no 
effect on the final allocation of the prize or the w lfare of the bidders. 
The bribes generate expected revenue for the auctioneer, and because 
bidders are not affected, the bribes also generate an xpected loss to 
the seller compared to a first-price auction without bribery. 
This analysis suggests that since bidders are not hurt by the 
corruption, but the seller is, it should be the seller who takes measures 
to fight corruption. No policy need be enacted to “protect” bidders 
from “unscrupulous” auctioneers. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I analyzed a model of bribery in sealed-bid first-
price auctions. The bribery involves the auctioneer, who acts as an 
agent on behalf of the seller, and the bidders. The results show that, 
given the size of the bribe set by the auctioneer, bidders with 
valuations above some threshold pay the bribe, while bidders with 
lower valuations do not. In equilibrium, bidders who pay the bribe bid 
their valuations while bidders who do not pay the bribe bid according 
to the standard first-price auction bid function. The auctioneer sets the 
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bribe to trade off the amount collected from a bidder who pays the 
bribe and the number of bidders expected to pay it. 
I also studied the welfare properties of the auction with bribery 
and show that it is efficient and, in equilibrium, bribes are a transfer 
from the seller to the auctioneer. Although bribery changes the bid 
functions of some bidders, namely those with sufficiently high 
valuations, it has no effect on the final allocation f the prize or the 
welfare of the bidders. The bribes generate expected revenue for the 
auctioneer, and because bidders are not affected, the bribes also 
generate an expected loss to the seller compared to a first-price 
auction without bribery. 
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Appendix 
Theorem 1: Given the amount of the bribe α , and given that 




11 )( 1  vdFvbb
nα , then there exists a unique Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium in which bidders with values in [0,v*) do not pay the 
bribe and bidders with values in [v*, 1] do pay the bribe, where *v  
solves 








n vdFvbvb       
and 1b  is the standard first-price auction bid function. 
Proof of theorem 1 
Lemma: In any equilibrium every bidder uses a cutoff strategy. 
Proof of Lemma: Fix any equilibrium and consider the (right-
continuous) cdf, Gi(b), of the highest bid of bidders j ≠ i.  Also let 
xi(b) denote the probability of i winning with bid b against the rival 
bidders employing their equilibrium strategies. (Note that xi(b) may 
not equal Gi(b) since a tie may arise at a mass point b.) Let Bc be the 
set of b’s for which G is continuous, and let Bm be the set of b’s for 









iic bGbGbvbdGbvvU   






iic += ∫             (A1) 
for any v’. 
Now consider 
Uin(v) = supb(v − b)xi(b). 
It follows that 
Uin(v) = maxb(v − b)Gi(b), 
since (v − b)Gi(b) is an upper envelope of (v − b)xi(b). One can check 
that Uin(v) is absolutely continuous, that the maximum is well d fined 
(since an upper envelope is upper semicontinuous and the choice can 
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be bound to a compact set without loss of generality), and that f(b,v) 
:= (v − b)Gi(b) is differentiable in v for every b in the equilibrium 







iin += ∫  
                                                 (A2) 
for ∈)(* sb  argmaxb(v − b)xi(b). 






iiinic −+−=− ∫  (A3) 
Since b*(s) < s for almost every s, it is clear from (A3) that, 
whenever Uic(v') − Uin(v') > 0, it must be that Uic(v) − Uin(v) > 0 for v 
> v', which proves that the equilibrium strategy must involve a cutoff 
strategy with some threshold vi
*. □ 
 By Lemma 2 every bidder uses a cutoff strategy, so there 
exist values v1
*,…,vn
* such that bidder i pays the bribe if vi ≥ vi
* and 
does not pay the bribe if vi < vi
*. It remains to show that v1
*= … = vn
* 
= v*. 
I first show that the lowest of the n cutoff points is v*. Suppose 
that player i has the lowest threshold point, vi
*, and draws the 
valuation vi. If he pays the bribe he bids his valuation, but if he does 
not pay the bribe he bids the standard first-price equilibrium bid, since 
everyone below him also bids according to the standard first-price 
equilibrium bid function. Then, letting Hi(·) denote the cdf of the 





















iiiiniic vdHvbvbvUvU                    (A4) 
The right-hand side is obviously increasing in vi
* (since the bid 
function increases) and it is equal to zero when vi
* = v*. Consequently, 
there is no equilibrium in which the lowest threshold point is below v*. 
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I next show that the highest of the n cutoff points is also v*. 
Suppose that i has the highest threshold value vi
* > v*, and choose 









−+−=− ∫   (A5) 
By (A4), Uic(v
*) − Uin(v
*) = 0.  The integral in (A5) is positive 
for vi > v
*, since b*(s) < s for almost all s.  Consequently, bidder i 
wants to pay the bribe when he draws the valuation vi < vi





Birinci fiyat kapalı zarf açıkartırmalarında rüşvet ve bunun refah etkileri 
Bu çalışma mal sahibinin aracısı olan müzayedecinin tüm teklif verenlere yaklaşıp onlara, 
eğer bir miktar rüşvet verirlerse ve en yüksek teklifi verirlerse tekliflerini değiştirip sadece 
ikinci en yüksek teklifi ödemelerini söz verdiği bir açık artırma üzerinedir. Dengede, belirli bir
miktarın üzerindeki değere sahip teklif verenler rüşveti verecektir ve kendi değ rlerini teklif 
vereceklerdir. Rüşvet ve ahlaki bozulma açık artırmanın verimliliği ve teklif verenlerin 
beklenen kazançları üzerine bir etki yaratmamıştır. Ancak, toplam rüşvet satıcıdan 
müzayedeciye bir servet transferi olarak karşımıza çıkar.    
